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The Post-Soviet regionalism is a new phenomenon and it requires a theory which
addresses the very beginning of regional integration. Both Neofunctionalism and (liberal)
intergovernmentalism conceptualize the very outset of European integration, thus, pre-
senting the most adequate theoretical framework for understanding post-Soviet case of
regionalism. This study seeks to contribute to a better understanding of the impediments
to regional integration but also to conditions under which integration might succeed in
Post-Soviet Eurasia. The numerous and unsuccessful attempts at regional integration in the
post-Soviet Eurasia provide an opportunity to analyze the factors unfavorable to integra-
tion and to identify the impediments to this process. The issue motivating this study is that
unsuccessful attempts should be analyzed not less than successful ones. Eurasian case is
different from European integration due to different historical legacies, institutional
choices, structural-developmental contexts and on-going state- and regime-building
problems. Regionalism and democratic development are a salient feature of recent
developments in Russia and the other republics of the former Soviet Union. The working
premise is that through various regional arrangements that operate across Eurasia,
countries will be able to ﬁnd new cooperative solutions to existing problems. The main
question is, given the undeniable advantages of the integration, why there has been little
progress achieved? How the theories of regional integration can contribute to our
understanding of the puzzles of Eurasian regionalism? To address this question, the paper
focuses on a few theories of regional integration which will be applied to empirical
analysis of post-Soviet Eurasia. The main focus is made on neofunctionalism. However, the
study, will also consider the alternative explanation provided by (liberal) inter-
governmentalism. The article also analyses the role of historical legacies and the attempts
of post-Soviet states (PSSs) at regional integration and provides theoretical explanations of
the outcome of these attempts. The analysis evaluates the outcome of post-Soviet Eurasian
regionalism and tests the main theoretical assumptions. The analysis offered in this article
aspires to contribute to the studies of comparative regionalism and area studies.
Copyright  2011, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Produced and
distributed by Elsevier Limited. All rights reserved.-PaciﬁcResearchCenter,Hany1. Introduction
Given that Post-Soviet regionalism is a new
phenomenon, it counts only for about 16 years, it requiresangUniversity.ProducedanddistributedbyElsevierLimited.All rights reserved.
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integration.1 Both Neofunctionalism and (liberal) inter-
governmentalism conceptualize the very outset of Euro-
pean integration, thus, presenting the most adequate
theoretical framework for understanding post-Soviet case
of regionalism.
By now, the EU is the most signiﬁcant and far-reaching
among all attempts at regionalism. Therefore, it is likely
to provide some successful background for a comparative
analysis with other less successful attempts elsewhere in
the world (e.g., the Northeast Asian Region (NEAR); Post-
Soviet Eurasia; Latin America). This study seeks to
contribute to a better understanding of the impediments to
regional integration but also to conditions under which
integration might succeed in Post-Soviet Eurasia. Although
the world-wide comparative analysis is not the purpose of
the study, it is still useful to switch on some comparative
aspects of successful integration with unsuccessful one.
Theoretical framework of this study, based mainly on
neofunctionalism, helps to set out the criteria for such
a comparison.
The numerous and unsuccessful attempts at regional
integration in the post-Soviet Eurasia provide an opportu-
nity to analyze the factors unfavorable to integration and to
identify the impediments to this process. The issue moti-
vating this study is that unsuccessful attempts should be
analyzed not less than successful ones. Apart from theo-
retical interest, there is also an area-related puzzle involved
in the study: Howcome the former Soviet republics, sowell
interconnected during at least a century, disintegrated in
a fewmonths with little hope to re-establish any functional
cooperation in the region?
Eurasian case is different from European integration due
to different historical legacies, institutional choices,
structural-developmental contexts and on-going state- and
regime-building problems. The theories built on the EU’s
experience can be re-conceptualized and modiﬁed to take
into account the peculiarities, structural differences and
historical legacies of post-Soviet countries. The theoretical
re-conceptualization may help to sustain the democrati-
zation of PSSs through regionalization and, thus, it may be
usefully applied to explain the phenomenon of Eurasian
integration and contribute positively to its success.
By now, very little has been written on the numerous
attempts at regional integration and cooperation taking
place in post-Soviet Eurasia: the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States (CIS); the Economic Cooperation Organi-
zation (ECO); the Eurasian Economic Community
(EURASEC or EEC); the Single Economic Space (SES); the
Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Initiative1 I am grateful to Philippe Schmitter and to Michael Keating for their
feedback on earlier draft of this paper. Some portions of the study are
drawn on Obydenkova (2010a). The previous drafts of this paper had
been presented at the PhD seminar at the European University Institute
(EUI, Florence) in March 2006 and had gained from the feedback
provided by the colleagues of the EUI, Centre for Political and Constitu-
tional Studies (Madrid), and Moscow Lomonosov State University. Last
but not least, I am grateful to the Ramon y Cajal program of Ministerio de
Ciencia e Innovacion (Spain) and to the Universitat Pompeu Fabra
(Barcelona).(CAREC); the Central Asian Cooperation Organization
(CACO); The Special Programme for the Economies of
Central Asia (SPECA); The Shanghai Cooperation Organi-
zation (SCO), etc. Nevertheless, regionalism and democratic
development are a salient feature of recent developments
in Russia and the other republics of the former Soviet
Union. This study will focus on the CIS as a case-study. It is
chosen as a case-study because it was the ﬁrst and themost
long-lasted attempt at institutionalization of integration in
the region. The working premise is that through various
regional arrangements that operate across Eurasia, coun-
tries will be able to ﬁnd new cooperative solutions to
existing problems.
A few clariﬁcations are important in this context. The
ﬁrst one is concerned with our deﬁnition of “integration”,
“regional cooperation”, and “regionalism”. One of the
classical and accepted deﬁnitions of regional integration
was offered by Lindberg who deﬁned political integration
as “(1) the process whereby nations forgo the desire and
ability to conduct foreign and key domestic policies inde-
pendently of each other, seeking instead to make joint
decisions or to delegate the decision-making process to new
central organs; and (2) the process whereby political actors
in several distinct settings are persuaded to shift their
expectations and political activities to a new center”.2 Haas
offered a similar deﬁnition of regional integration as “the
process whereby political actors in several distinct national
settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations
and political activities towards a new centre, whose insti-
tutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-
existing national states”.3 Thus, “integration” implies
well-developed cooperation which has led to the creation
of a new polity bringing together a number of different
constituent units, “member states”. Apparently, in our
attempt to conceptualize regionalism in Eurasia, none of
the deﬁnitions permit to describe it as “integration” per se.
In this paper, “integration” is understood as a process and
“cooperation” as the initial stage of this process. The paper
employs the notion of “regionalism” as the development of
institutionalized cooperation among states and other
actors on the basis of regional contiguity.
1.1. The beneﬁts of regional cooperation
The post-Soviet states share a number of problems
which can be resolved only in the framework of close
cooperation, if not integration. These are environmental
problems and natural threats, rebuilding weakened social
systems, restructuring cross-border communication links,
trade, recovering transport communication, combating
drug- and human-trafﬁcking, terrorist invasion coming
from neighboring Muslim countries, improving water and
energy distribution system, etc.
Given that most of the PSSs are landlocked, some of the
PSSs are heavily dependent on their immediate neighbors
for access to the rest of the world. The water, energy and
other resources are asymmetrically distributed across these2 Lindberg (1963): 6.
3 Haas (1961).
6 Finn Laursen (2003); Hettne, Inotai, and Sunkel (1999); Obydenkova
(2006a, 2006b).
7
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one. Thus, the issues of integration are of special, almost
vital, importance for PSSs in general and for Central Asian
countries in particular. Through integration, they can
overcome their geographic isolation in the middle of Eur-
asia. The close cooperationwill help to overcome the legacy
of disintegration, their mutual suspicions (as a potential for
inter-ethnic, interstate, cross-border conﬂicts). It also
forges closer economic, natural resources, social and insti-
tutional links with each other and with their neighbors.
The experts of the UNDP4 calculated that in terms of
gains from cooperation or losses from non-cooperation, the
largest measured aggregate economic gains come from the
reduction in trade costs, and the largest losses from civil
war. Additional beneﬁts from migrants’ remittances can be
very large for some countries. The economic costs of such
risks as HIV/AIDS and Tuberculosis treatment, natural
disasters the region faces are high as well. On all of these
issues, regional cooperation can help limit costs and
increase beneﬁts.
“Hard” borders with trade and transit restrictions,
complicatedand tangledvisa requirements, non-recognition
of educational diplomas, disappearance of personnel
connections, networks of professionals, the barriers to the
mobility and networking are all the challenges to the
development of any form of integration in the region.
The beneﬁts would stem from creating a better regional
investment climate, developing the region’s energy
resources, better managing regional environmental assets
and risks, and, last but not least, cooperating in education
and knowledge sharing.5
The beneﬁts of the cooperation in the region are
apparent. Given the historical legacies and experience of
former networks, some “channels” of integration would be
preserved or re-created. New “Union” based on democratic
and market-economic principles, rule of law, and could be
an engine of regime transition and economic transition in
the PSSs. The main question is, given the undeniable
advantages of the integration, why there has been little
progress achieved? How the theories of regional integra-
tion can contribute to our understanding of the puzzles of
Eurasian regionalism?
The paper proceeds as follows. The second section will
focus on a few theories of regional integration which will
be applied to empirical analysis of post-Soviet Eurasia. The
main focus is made on neofunctionalism. However, the
study, will also consider the alternative explanation
provided by (liberal) intergovernmentalism. The third
section will focus on the historical legacies and the
attempts of PSSs at regional integration and the fourth one
will provide theoretical explanations of the outcome of
these attempts. Fourth section evaluates the outcome of
post-Soviet Eurasian regionalism and tests the main theo-
retical assumptions. Finally, the conclusion will summarize
the theoretical implications for post-Soviet Eurasia and
their efforts in developing regional cooperation.4 UNDP (2005: 206).
5 UNDP (2005: 207).2. Theoretical debates
Since the Second World War, global politics have wit-
nessed the emergence of a new political phenomenon: the
cooperation of nation-states on “regional”, i.e. continental,
scale. Although the interaction between processes of
globalization and efforts at economic integration are not
limited to Europe, regional alliances in other parts of the
world are mainly about cooperation rather than integra-
tion. The phenomenon of the regionally based institution-
alized cooperation among states was deﬁned as “new
regionalism”.6
One of the major debates within theories of regional
integration was between neofunctionalism and inter-
governmentalism, followed by liberal intergovernme-
ntalism. Neofunctionalism is chosen for two main reasons.
First, it reﬂects the very outset of European integration. Later
theories on more developed stages of the EU would be
inapplicable to the studies of post-Soviet regionalism, which
is indeed in its very initial stage. Second, neofunctionalism
wasmeant to explain similar process beyond Europe andwas
meant toprovide explanations to regional integrationworld-
wide. It created a set of criteria which is helpful to explain
success and failure of these processes beyond Europe.7 To
account for possible alternative explanations of post-Soviet
regionalism, we also consider its main theoretical oppo-
nent – intergovernmentalism.
2.1. Neofunctionalism
Both neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism were
built on functionalism. The main idea of functionalism was
that mismatch between the territorial scale of human
problems and of political authority generates pressures for
jurisdictional reform. In other words, the welfare beneﬁts
of supranationalism would impel reform. The clear welfare
beneﬁts of “supranationalism” in terms of efﬁcient delivery
goods and service across PSSs were in place. However, as
recent history demonstrates, it was not sufﬁcient to create,
and even to maintain, those cross-national functions that
had been in place.
Neofunctionalism identiﬁed several background condi-
tions and political processes that intervened between
functionality and the structure of authority.8 Jurisdictional
reform had to be initiated and driven to reap economic
beneﬁts. This process is self-reinforcing: progress in one
area would give rise to pressures for integration in other
area.
Thus, the main idea of neofunctionalism is that regional
integration is a process developing through gradual inte-
gration of sector speciﬁc areas and “spillover” from inte-
grated functions (or areas) into new areas.9 In a very briefSee, for example, Haas and Schmitter (1964); Moravcsik (1998).
8 Ph. C. Schmitter (1969); L.N. Lindberg and St. A. Scheingold (1970).
9 Some of the scholars who developed this idea are Ernst B. Haas,
Philippe C. Schmitter, Leon Lindberg, Stuart Scheingold and J. S. Nye. The
main ideas of neofunctionalism are summarized in Kelstrup (1998: 28–
31).
Table 1
The Haas–Schmitter predictions about economic unions (EEC, CACM,
LAFTA).
EEC Central
American
common
market
LAFTA
Background conditions
1. Size of units Mixed High Mixed
2. Rate of transactions High Low Mixed
3. Pluralism High Mixed Mixed
4. Elite complementarity High Mixed Mixed
Total Judgment High Mixed Mixed
Conditions at the time of economic union
5. Governmental Purposes High Mixed Low
6. Powers of union High Low Low
Total Judgment High Mixed- Low
Process conditions
7. Decision-making style Mixed Low Mixed
8. Rate of transaction High Mixed Mixed
9. Adaptability of
governments
High ? Mixed
Total judgment High Mixed? Mixed
Chances of automatic
politicization
Good Possible Possible-
doubtful
Sources: Haas and Schmitter (1964); Reprinted in Finn Laursen (2003: 10).
I have left out other examples of regional integration whichwere analyzed
in this study (EFTA, OECD, East African Common Market, West Africam
Federation, and the Organization Africaine et Malagache de Cooperation
Economique, OAMCE).
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political spillover; c) the importance of supranational
organizations. Functional spillover implies that integration
within certain functional areas will push actors to further
integration in other areas. For example, in the case of
European integration, cooperation was started with the
coal sector, which created a push towards cooperation in
other sectors (energy). Similarly, political spillover implies
that integration within some areas will lead to further
support for the new political arena, strengthening new
centre and potentially providing support of public and
forming eventually a new community. Another element of
neofunctionalism is trust in the importance of suprana-
tional organizations. Haas also refers to geographic spill-
over in his works on neofunctionalism.
Haas distinguished three background conditions for
regional integration: social structure; economic and
industrial development; and ideological patterns. The
European states were pretty much homogenous along
these parameters.10 According to Haas, “countries domi-
nated by a non-pluralistic social structure are poor candi-
dates for participation in the integration process” (Haas,
1961). Later, in a study of Latin American integration,
Philippe Schmitter added more conditions such as “the size
and power of the units joining in the economic union”, “the
rate of transactions” and elite complementarity. Then, Haas
and Schmitter included two conditions at the time of union
(governmental purposes and powers of the union) and
three “process conditions” (decision-making style, rate of
transaction and adaptability of governments) (Table 1).11
As the table demonstrates, the EEC scored high on most
of these variables and the Latin American Free Trade
Association (LAFTA) scored mixed to low. This criteria of
conditions of regional integration can also be applied to
PSSs to explain the present outcome of integration process
and predict its’ development. Therefore, we will analyze
the PSSs as member states of the CIS according to this
criteria.2.2. Considering alternatives: intergovernmentalism and
liberal intergovernmentalism
To account for possible alternative explanations of
Eurasian regionalism, the study considers the theory of
(liberal) intergovernmentalism. Intergovernmentalism
approached the phenomenon of regional integration from
perspective of nation-states. It was based on realism and
argued that states are the major actors of international
relations. States were considered as actors following only
their own interests. The main priority of these actors is
survival and accumulation of power. The “ﬁrst wave” of
intergovernmentalism was initiated in the 1960s with
Stanley Hoffman as one of the main representatives.
According to his view, European integration could be
relatively successful in economic area, but not in politics
(Hoffmann, 1966).10 Haas (1961).
11 Haas and Schmitter (1964).Intergovernmentalism provides some interesting theo-
retical background which may contribute to the under-
standing of the Eurasian regionalism: the importance of
national politics (autocratic and/or democratic regimes,
transitional regime, etc.), perception of states as “rational
actors” pursuing only their own interests and survival, as
actors with purely strategic attitude towards integration.
Similarly to intergovernmentalism, liberal inter-
governmentalism argues that governments act as rational
actors pursuing domestic goals and interests (Moravcsik,
1994: 53). Integration is formed through interstate bar-
gaining. State negotiate “deals” on the basis of their pref-
erences and power. Themost powerful states have themost
power to decide and the treaties concluded are to their
advantage. This approach implies the presence of the
leader in a region.
Moravcsik in The Choice for Europe suggests that his
study could be used to analyze the regional cooperation/
integration in different parts of the world (1998).
According to liberal intergovernmentalism, integration
presents a “process of collective choice through which
conﬂicting interests are reconciled”.12 The regional inte-
gration is, thus, interpreted as the process of intergovern-
mental “bargains”. According to Moravcsik, asymmetrical
interdependence has more explanatory power.13
Another important observation made by Moravcsik is
that intra-regional trade in relation to GDP should be12 Moravcsik (1994: 53).
13 Laursen (2003: 15); Moravcsik (1998: 24).
Table 2
“Contextual” asymmetries among the CIS-member states.
Country Population
(1993)
(in 1000)
Area
(1997) in
(1000 sq. km.)
Predominant
Religion
Location
Azerbaijan 7368 86.600 Islam Transcaucasus
Armenia 3722 29.800 Christianity Transcaucasus
Belarus 10346 207.600 Christianity Europe
Georgia 5447 69.700 Christianity Transcaucasus
Kazakhstan 16986 2724.900 Islam Central Asia
Kyrgyzstan 4502 199.900 Islam Central Asia
Moldova 4348 33.800 Christianity Europe
Russia 148673 17075.400 Christianity Europe and
Asia
Tajikistan 5571 143.100 Islam Central Asia
Turkmenistan 4254 491.200 Islam Central Asia
Uzbekistan 21,703 447.400 Islam Central Asia
Ukraine 52,244 603.700 Christianity Europe
CIS 285,164 22113.100 – Eurasia
Sources: This data is available in a number of internet dataset. See, for
example, http://www.cis.minsk.by/.
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states. He considers regional trade dependency is the factor
which indicated the “demand” for integration. Thus, for
example, this is much higher in Europe than in other parts
of the world (he compares it with North America and East
Asia). This study extends the comparative analysis to the
post-Soviet Eurasian states.
The idea of powerful state-leader was developed in both
late neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism.14
However, neofunctionalism underlined the negative role
of asymmetry between the states and, thus, of a “state-
leader”. In contrast, (liberal) intergovernmentalism saw the
presence of a “leader” as a lever for integration, donor
willing to cover disproportional cost of integration.
This theoretical overview of two contrasting approa-
ches - neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmental-
ism – provides us with important tools of analysis of
Eurasian regionalism.
3. Supranational institutions of CIS
After 16 years of its existence, the CIS does not seem to
reach much in the development of regional cooperation
between the PSSs. On the contrary, it seems to demonstrate
increasing divergence of interests and strategies of its
former and current member states. Most of the agreements
of the CIS remained “ink on the paper” and were never
implemented. To understand this paradox of extensive
promises and enthusiasm about the regional cooperation in
the post-Soviet Eurasia and so poor progress, this section
will brieﬂy outline the historical legacies, “shadow of the14 In the most recent studies of comparative regionalism, Walter Mattli
(1999 and 2003) underlines the importance of “supply factors”, the
presence of a leader among the group of countries involved in regional
cooperation: “Such a state serves as a focal point in the coordination of
rules, regulations, and policies; it may also help to ease distributional
tensions by acting as regional paymaster” Mattli (1999: 14). However, it
not the purpose to go deep into recent theoretical discussion on this
issue, but only to create theoretical framework of the earlier studies of
integration.past”, and, as its continuation and development, the
supranational institutions of the CIS as a USSR-successor.
The new Union, the CIS, was initially established by
Russia, Belarus and Ukraine in 1991. By 1993, all of the PSSs
except for the Baltic states had joined it. Formally the CIS
possesses coordinating powers in the realm of trade,
ﬁnance, lawmaking, and security.15 The most signiﬁcant
issue for the CIS is the establishment of a full-ﬂedged free
trade zone and economic union between the member
states. However, it has also promoted cooperation on such
political issues as democratization and cross-border crime
prevention. The CIS can be described as an attempt at both
economic and political integration.
The main document of the CIS, the Charter of the
Commonwealth, was adopted on 22 January 1993. The
Charter outlines the “objectives” of the CIS which include
both political and economic aspects of the integration. For
example, the Charter stipulates that the CIS is “based on
principles of sovereign equality of all itsmembers” and aims
at serving for “furtherdevelopment and strengtheningof the
relationships of friendship, good neighbourhood, inter-
ethnic harmony, trust, mutual understanding and mutually
advantageous cooperation among the Member States”.16
Another important document of the CIS is Economic
Union Treaty. It was established in 1993 to encourage
economic integration within the member states. It states
that “The Treaty was based on the necessity of formation of
the common economic space on the principles of free
movement of goods, services, workers, capitals; elabora-
tion of concernedmoney and credit, tax, price, customs and
foreign economic policies, rapproachment of the methods
of management of economic activities, creation of favorable
conditions for development of direct production links”.17
Finally, the document outlining military and security
aspects of new form regional block is the Collective Security
Treaty. The Collective Security Treaty was signed on May
15, 1992, by Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia,
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, in the city of Tashkent.
Azerbaijan likewise signed the treaty on September 24,
1993, Georgia on December 9, 1993 and Belarus on
December 31, 1993. The treaty came into effect on April 20,
1994. The treaty reafﬁrmed the desire of all participating
states to abstain from the use or threat of force. Signatories
wouldn’t be able to join other military alliances or other
groups of states, while an aggression against one signatory
would be perceived as an aggression against all.
The Collective Security Treaty was set to last for a 5-year
period unless extended. On April 2, 1999, the Presidents of
Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and
Tajikistan, signed a protocol renewing the treaty for another
ﬁve year period. However, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbe-
kistan refused to sign andwithdrew from the treaty instead.
On October 7, 2002, the six members of the Collective
Security Treaty, signed a charter in Chisinau (Moldova),15 The CIS is headquartered in Minsk, Belarus. The chairman of the CIS is
known as the Executive Secretary.
16 Charter of the CIS: http://www.cis.minsk.by/ Accessed in June 2005.
17 Economic Union Treaty: http://www.cis.minsk.by/ Accessed in June
2005.
Table 3
Asymmetries in the economic development of the PSSs (for 1995).
Country GDP Industrial
Input
Investment Foreign
Debt as
a % of GDP
Azerbaijan 83 83 57 46
Armenia 107 102 – 93
Belarus 90 88 59 18
Georgia 102 91 103 69
Kazakhstan 91 92 63 20
Kyrgyzstan 94 82 182 35
Moldova 97 94 83 65
Russia 96 97 90 34
Tajikistan 88 95 75 216
Turkmenistan 90 93 100 212
Uzbekistan 99 100 104 21
Ukraine 88 83 65 29
Note: The data is given in percentage in relations to a mean.
Sources: This data is available in a number of internet dataset. See, for
example, http://www.cis.minsk.by/.
Table 4
Volume indices of gross domestic product (constant prices).
2001 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
As percentage of the previous year
Azerbaijan 109.9 111.2 110.2 126.41 134.51 125.01
Armenia 109.6 114.0 110.5 113.9 113.3 113.7
Belarus 104.7 107.0 111.4 109.4 110.0 108.2
Georgia 104.8 111.1 105.9 109.6 109.4 112.72
Kazakhstan 113.5 109.3 109.6 109.7 110.7 108.5
Kyrgyzstan 105.3 107.0 107.0 99.8 103.1 108.2
Moldova 106.1 106.6 107.4 107.5 104.0 103.32
Russia 105.1 107.3 107.2 106.4 107.4 108.1
Tajikistan 109.6 111.0 110.3 106.7 107.0 107.8
Uzbekistan 104.2 104.4 107.7 107.0 107.3 109.82
Ukraine 109.2 109.6 112.1 102.7 107.1 107.3
CIS average 106 108 108 107 108 109
Sources: Composed by the author based on CIS Annual data retrieved from
the statistics provided by the Interstate Statistical Committee of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (http://www.cisstat.com/eng/mac-
01.htm accessed on 10 March 2008).
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Treaty Organization (CSTO). During 2005 the CSTO partners
have concluded some commonmilitary drills. Uzbekistan is
currently seeking again closer ties with Russia and so may
consider joining the Collective Security Treaty Organization
again. The Collective Security Treaty Organization is also an
observer organization to the United Nations General
Assembly
The CIS member states interact and coordinate through
the following main bodies: Council of the Heads of States,
Interstate Bank, Council of Foreign Ministers, Council of
Defence Ministers, Inter-Parliamentary Assembly,
Economic Court, Economic Council, Executive Committee,
Council of the Heads of Governments.183.1. Economic integration
With the demise of the rouble zone the main potential
mechanism of fostering economic integration has been the
concept of a payment union. However, the progress had
been modest. With the ﬁnancial crises of rouble in Russia
in 1998, the previous plans and schemes failed. The difﬁ-
culties of establishing an effective payments mechanism
within the CIS have been the most signiﬁcant impediment
within the CIS.
There has been discussion about the creation of
a “common economic space” between the countries of
Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Agreement in
principle about the creation of this space, was announced
after a meeting in the Moscow suburb of Novo-Ogarevo on
February 23, 2003. The Common Economic Space would
involve a supranational commission on trade and tariffs
that would be based in Kiev, would be initially headed by
a representative of Kazakhstan, and would not be subor-
dinate to the governments of the four nations. The ultimate
goal would be a regional organization that would be open
for other countries to join as well, and could eventually lead
even to a single currency.18 For the details of structure of the CIS, see Appendix 1.On 22 May 2003 The Verkhovna Rada (the Ukrainian
Parliament) voted 266 votes in favour and 51 against the
joint economic space. However, Viktor Yushchenko’s
victory in the Ukrainian presidential election of 2004 was
a signiﬁcant move against the project: Yushchenko has
shown renewed interest in Ukrainian membership in the
European Union, and such membership would be incom-
patible with the envisioned Common Economic Space.
With the revival of the Eurasian Economic Community in
2005 there is a possibility for the “common economic
space” agenda to be implemented in its framework with or
without the participation of Ukraine.193.2. Political integration
Unlike any other form of integration (economic or
military), political integration is generally considered the
most advanced and the most difﬁcult stage of integration
process. Economic integration brings about material gains.
The beneﬁts of political integration are less obvious.
Integration at the political level within the framework of
the CIS has also been extremely weak. Being republics of
highly centralized USSR resulted in resistance of the newly
independent states to transfer any political and economic
powers to the CIS. However, the political aspect of inte-
gration is very important in the area. It might be considered
even essential, given that CIS incorporates Western and
Eastern, Christian and Islamic civilizations and diverse
national culture.
There is a tendency to bilateral solutions to speciﬁc
issues. However, multilateral cooperation took place in
such issues as policing and criminal intelligence and
security. Among other important political issues are the
problems of ethnic minorities and territorial borders.
After the collapse of the USSR, the issue of ethnic
minorities dispersed all around the PSSs became one of the
most important problems to be solved. The majority of19 UNIAN: Information Agency: http://www.unian.net/eng/news/news-
163819.html Accessed in December 2005.
Table 5
Background conditions: the share of export and important.29
Soviet
Republics
in 1989
Export Import EU’s members
in 1958
Export Import
Russia 7.3 7.7 England 2.2 (UK 3)* 2,4
Armenia 25.4 24.3 Belgium – –
Azerbaijan 25.4 15.6 Luxemburg 22,9 15,1
Belarus 23.5 19.3 Denmark 10,6 8,3
Georgia 23.6 19.8 Germany 4,3 (6)* 3,7
Kazakhstan 9.9 15.9 Greece – –
Kyrgyzstan 17.6 20.8 Ireland 26,4 24,0
Moldova 23.2 22.0 Spain – –
Tajikistan 18.3 24.4 Italy 2,3 2,3
Turkmenistan 19.7 21.2 Netherlands 15,6 17,3
Uzbekistan 15.3 20.1 Portugal – –
Ukraine 12.5 12.9 France 2,2 (3)* 2,3
Total 11.6 12.1 Total 4,4 4,1
Total
without
Russia
18.9
Sources: Adapted from Shishkov (2001: 391). Calculated from Narodnoe
hoziatsvo SSSR v 1990. M. 1991, p. 636, 639; Eurostat. Monthly External
Trade Bulletin, Special Issue: 1958–1977, Luxemburg, 1978, p. 23, 30, 32,
34; European Economy, N 14 (Nov.), p. 195; N 46 (Dec. 1990), p. 257, 261;
Eurostat Basic Statistics of the Community. Luxembourg. 1991, p. 226, 259.
The cases marked “*” are the data that was cited in Moravcsik (1998: 88)
and given in parenthesis).
Table 6
Share of the export of PSSs to non-PSSs (as % of their total export).
CIS-states 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999
Russia 40.8 76.2 82.2 80.7 85.3
Azerbaijan 7.2 36.1 60.2 51.6 77.3
Armenia 3.6 19.5 39.5 59.2 75.3
Uzbekistan 10.3 42.3 60.7 75.7 75.3*
Turkmenistan 2.3 41.4 32.5 39.9 74.4*
Ukraine 17.6 53.7 48.0 60.7 71.9
Kirgizia 1.5 33.8 34.2 47.2 59.6
Georgia 1.5 43.4 47.5 42.5 55.0
Tajikistan 11.8 69.0 66.4 63.4 54.3
Moldova 8.2 24.3 41.1 30.4 45.2
Belarus 7.7 23.3 37.7 26.3 38.6
Kazakhstan 7.8 33.5 47.1 55.2 73.9
* 1998; Sources: Shishkov (2001: 440); Statistical Handbook 1994; States
of the Former USSR.Washington, 1995, Tables 3,8; Foreign Trade Statistics
in the USSR and Successor States, Washington, 1995, p. 148–150;
Vneshneekonomicheskaia deiatelsnost gosudarstv Sodrujestva.
Statisticheskij sbornik, Moskva 1999; Statistika SNG; Statisticheskij biul-
leten, N 5, Mart 2000.
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separatist movements: Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan,
Chechnya in Russia, Abkhazia in Georgia. However, the CIS
did not contribute in conﬂict resolution and conﬂict
prevention. It lacks necessary mechanisms of conﬂict
resolution or preventive diplomacy. Common CIS citizen-
ship was not established either. However, Russia managed
to conclude a few bilateral treaties addressing this problem.
Dual citizenship agreements were signed with Tajikistan
and Turkmenistan.20
Another important issue of the CIS members was the
borders between former Soviet states. Most of the
“internal” Soviet borders were contested. This includes
Kazakhstan and its borders with Russia, Kyrgyzstan which
borders with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. A
number of the CIS documents (the CIS Founding Agree-
ment and the Alma-Ata Declaration) addressed this
problem calling to a respect for territorial border and the
inviolability of existing border at the point of the acqui-
sition of independence.21 Article 3 of the CIS Charter rules
out “any actions aimed at dismembering another state’s
territory”.22
Another documents, like for example, Declaration on
the Observance of Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity and
Inviolability of Border and bilateral Treaties of Friendship
and Cooperation, have references to mutual respect of
territory as a matter of course.29 The data is calculated as the percentage of the GNP of the relevant
states.
20 Mark Webber (1997: 63).
21 The CIS Alma-Ata Declaration. Article 5. Also it is referred to in Mark
Webber (1997: 62).
22 Founding Agreements, pp. 2, 9. Can be found at http://www.cis.minsk.
by/.One of the issues of political integration is common
language. So far Russian is an ofﬁcial language in four of
these states: Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.
Russian is also considered an ofﬁcial language in the
separatist regions of Abkhazia and Transnistria, as well as
the semi-autonomous region of Gagauzia in Moldova.
In other schemes of regional integration (EU, NAFTA,
MERCOSUR, etc.) economic integration is likely to be the
ﬁrst stage of regional integration, which might be followed
by more complicated political integration. As it is the case
with other blocks of the integration, their member states’
departure point is sovereignty and independence from
each other. The starting point for the integrationwithin the
CIS is critically different. Both economic and political stages
of the CIS-integration have been inﬂuenced by the histor-
ical legacies – being once the parts of the politically and
economically highly centralized country. This is the major
feature which determine the peculiarities of the further
process of CIS-integration.
Estimating the results of 16 years of the CIS’s existence,
it is impossible to ignore that the progress was more than
modest. Despite the wide range of bureaucratic structures,
numerous treaties, they were all remained nothing but
“attempts” and unrealized plans.
All in all, the experience of regional integration within
the CIS can be described as unsuccessful. However, the
theoretical puzzle remains: How theories of regional inte-
gration can explain the fruitlessness of 16 years of its’
existence? The following attempts to provide an answer to
this question referring to neofunctionalism and its main
alternative theory, (liberal) intergovernmentalism.4. Evaluating outcome of “integration”: testing the
theory
Applying the criteria set out in neofunctionalism to
explain the Eurasian regionalism, we divide it into three
parts presented in tables: “background conditions”; “condi-
tions at time of economic union”; and “process condition”.
Along with alternative explanation, intergovernmentalism,
Table 7
Progress of the PSSs in economic transition in 1992–1998.
Countries Share of private
sector in GDP (%)
Privatization of
large enterprises
Privatization of
small enterprises
Liberalization
of prices
Freedom of
market competition
Russia 70 3þ 4 3 2þ
Georgia 60 3þ 4 3 2
Kirgizia 60 3 4 3 2
Armenia 60 3 3 3 2
Kazakhstan 55 3 4 3 2
Ukraine 55 2þ 3þ 3 2
Moldova 45 3 3þ 3 2
Azerbaijan 45 2 3 3 1
Uzbekistan 45 3 3 2 2
Tajikistan 30 2 2þ 3 1
Turkmenistan 25 2 2 2 1
Belarus 20 1 2 2 2
Sources: Shishkov (2001: 409; The Economic Report. The Economist Intelligence Unit. London, March 1999.
System of evaluation: “4” – “more than 50% of programmes of economic transition and the progress in economic transition is signiﬁcant”; “3” – “more than
25% of programmes”; “2” – “progress is fair”, and “1” – “almost no progress at all”.
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between potential member states, the importance of
national politics (democracy vs. autocracy), and geopolitical
versus economic beneﬁts motivations for entering the
agreement on integration.
One of the important features of PSSs determining the
development of the integration within the CIS is the great
diversity of its members, or, using the vocabulary of inter-
governmentalism, “asymmetries”.
A number of scholars and experts of post-Soviet Eurasia
underlined this diversity.23 As Ofer and Pomfret (2004)
points it out, “Despite the common historical background
in the Soviet era, initial conditions in the CIS countries in
1991 varies substantially due to geography, resource
endowment, the economic impact of the break-up of the
Soviet Union, initial income levels and industrial struc-
ture”.24 In this section, we will analyze some of the most
important of these asymmetries. It is also important to
outline the main problems of economic and political
development and the issues of regime transition as the
most important problem in national politics of these states.4.1. Background conditions or “contextual” asymmetries
4.1.1. Geopolitical disparities
Neofunctionalism underlined the “unusual” homoge-
neity of ﬁrst six original member states of European inte-
gration. Their common Conservative and Catholic
background and high degreemutual trust might havemade
them to initiate the cooperation.25 Schmitter reminds that
back to the 1950s, the beginning of regional cooperation in
Europe, the Protestant Britain was governed by the Labor
Party. In contrast, the perspective member states of post-
Soviet regionalism, did not only belong to different
confessions within the Christianity but included two
different, often juxtaposed, religion – Christianity and23 See for example Libman (2006), Ofer and Pomfret (2004), Webber
(1998).
24 Gur Ofer and Pomfret (2004: 268).
25 See, for example, Schmitter (2005: 269).Islam. In addition, the CIS members differ widely across
such factors as territory and population, economic and
social development, political regimes, history. The
following table demonstrates some of these disparities.
Conditionally, we divide the variety of diversities of the
FSSs into “contextual”, “economic development”, and
“political indicators”. The “contextual” conditions are those
which are considered unchangeable in the short-run:
population, area, predominant religion, and geographic
location) (Table 2).
The CIS incorporates over 100 nations and nationalities,
including 50 traditionally Christian and almost 40 Islamic
ones. It is also helpful for the analysis of the CIS, to make
geopolitical distinction between “European”, “Central
Asian”, and Transcaucasian Former Soviet States. By now,
the most successful attempts at regional integration took
place within the EU with its members being “Europeans”.
In other words, all “old” and “new” members of the EU –
Western European states and Eastern (or Central) European
ones – belong to the same continent, Europe. The literature
on regionalism often asserted the ideas of “common heri-
tage”, “historical and cultural legacies”, continental
belonging as important factors that contributed to the
success of European integration. In contrast, the post-
Soviet states present cross-continental and religious
mosaic (e.g., the post-Soviet territory can be subdivided
into European, Asian, Caucasian states). However, there is
great diversity even among the states of each particular
geographic group, as the following tables demonstrate
(Tables 3 and 4). To the “European” group belong Ukraine,
Moldova, Belarus. The second group is composed by ﬁve
Central Asian republics: Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,
Kyrgyzstan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan. Finally, the three
Caucasian states are Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan.
The support of newly independent former Soviet States
for the CIS was also different. Tajikistan joined CIS in 1991.
There is one former, or associate, member, Turkmenistan,
which joined the CIS in 1991 and withdrew in 2005.
Azerbaijan ratiﬁed CIS membership only in September
1993. Georgia joined CIS even later, in March 1994. There
are two possible explanations for this disparity among the
PSSs in support for the CIS. The ﬁrst one stems from the
Table 8
Six Components of democratic governance: Estimation for 2000/2001.
Country Average
transition
score
Voice and
accountability
Political stability;
no violence
Government
effectiveness
Regulatory
quality
Rule of
law
Control of
corruption
Belarus 2 17.2 50 16.9 2.4 20 54.7
Kazakhstan 3 24.1 59.3 31.9 23.7 31.8 23
Russia 3 38.5 33.3 33.1 6.5 17.1 12.4
Turkmenistan 1þ 6.3 52.5 9.4 3 12.9 6.2
Uzbekistan 2 13.2 13 21.3 11.2 27.6 29.2
Georgia 3 50 14.8 28.1 17.8 39.4 28.6
Armenia 3 44.8 17.9 15 23.1 45.3 24.2
Moldova 3 59.8 40.1 12.5 12.4 40 23
Kyrgyzstan 3 31.6 39.5 31.9 20.7 26.5 20.5
Ukraine 2þ 41.4 26.5 26.9 13.6 31.2 19.3
Azerbaijan 2þ 27 22.2 18.1 39.1 21.8 10.6
Tajikistan 2þ 27.6 3.1 7.5 5.9 4.7 9.3
Average CIS 36.9 22.1 20.2 18.0 29.6 20.6
Note: Not including the Baltic states.
Sources: The ﬁrst column is based on the database of the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) (2002), Transition Report, System of
evaluation: “4” – “more than 50% of programmes of economic transition and the progress in economic transition is signiﬁcant”; “3” – “more than 25% of
programmes”; “2” – “progress is fair”, and “1” – “almost no progress at all”. And the rest of the columns are based onWorld Bank Institute, New Governance
Indicators database reproduced in Gur Ofer and Richard Pomfret (2004: 21). For the columns with the last 6 indicators grades are assigned according to the
scale between 0 and 100 with index for developed countries equal to 100.
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members can “jump on” and “jump-out” whenever they
want to. Thus, the CIS presents an example of “open
regionalism”. Another explanation is the desire of new
states to keep their options open in foreign policy. The
membership in the CIS does not allow for double
membership, for example in the NATO and in the EU. Thus,
the actual and prospective members of the CIS had to
decide on their “loyalties” in foreign policy choices, which
led to above-mentioned changes in membership of the CIS.
Meanwhile, a number of PSSs have expressed their
doubts on the effectiveness and future of the CIS. Minister
of Economics of Ukraine said at a news conference that
“there is no hope for CIS development” and that Ukrainian
government is considering halting its ﬁnancial contribution
to the CIS bodies (April 8, 2005).26 In August 2005,
Turkmenistan downgraded its CIS status to an associate
member. Georgia has repeatedly exhibited its skepticism
on its future participation in the CIS. Thus, already in 2004,
the Defense Minister of Georgia, Giorgi Baramidze,
described the CIS as “yesterday’s history”. In February 2006,
Georgia ofﬁcially withdrew from the Council of Defense
Ministers. On May 2, 2006, the President of Georgia,
Mikheil Saakashvili said that the government would review
whether the country was beneﬁting from being a CIS
member.27 The Among the FSSs only the Baltic states
remained ﬁrmly outside.
Geopolitical location seems to be an important factor in
post-Soviet regionalism. The experience of the PSSs contra-
dicts the assumption of intergovernmentalism on insigniﬁ-
cance of geopolitics. Indeed, the states located in “European”
part of the former USSR (e.g., Moldova and Ukraine) were26 http://www.interfax.ru/e/B/politics/28.html?id_issue¼11267754
Accessed in April, 2005 (Speech on April 9, 2005).
27 International Relations and Security Network, “Georgia considers
withdrawing from CIS” (http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?
id¼15687), Accessed in May 2006.less inclined to post-Soviet (re-)integration, with Belarus
being an exception. In contrast, states isolated in Central Asia
supported the initiative of regional integration.
4.1.2. Economic disparities
The following table summarizes the disparity of CIS
member states across the main indices of economic
development in 1995.
The above tables demonstrate great varieties across the
Post-Soviet countries and growing divergence across the
time (as the most recent period chosen as an example is
2001–2007).28 The countries with the largest GDP and
industrial input are Armenia, Georgia, Russia, Uzbekistan.
And the CIS-members with the highest foreign debt are
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. The differences in economic
development and the dependence on the economy of
Russia provide some explanation as to how and why the
enthusiasm of newly independent former Soviet states was
different in their support for the CIS.4.2. Intra-regional trade (rate of transactions)
Both Neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism
underlined the importance of intra-regional trade, or “rate of
transactions”. An important observationmade byMoravcsik
is that intra-regional trade in relation to GDP is much higher
in Europe than in other parts of the world (he compares it
with North America and East Asia). As Moravcsik observes,
“differences in export patterns and competitiveness explain
varied national preferences concerning the direction and
speed of liberalization” (1998: 88). However, comparison of
the EEC andCIS provides peculiar results – the intra-regional
trade for themoment of creation of the CIS (1989–1991)was
much higher than in EEC (1958) (Table 5).28 The Appendix provides more statistical data on the post-Soviet
countries.
Table 9
The Haas–Schmitter predictions about economic unions (1964).
Background Conditions Member of the CIS
by disintegration
of the USSR (1989)
European
Economic
Community
(1964)
1. Size of units Mixed Mixed
2. Rate of transactions High High
3. Pluralism Low High
4. Elite complementarity High High
Total judgment High/mixed High
Table 10
Conditions at time of economic union.
Conditions at time of
economic union
CIS in 1991 European
economic
community
(1964)
1. Governmental purposes Mixed High
2. Powers of union Mixed (formally)
and Low (nominal)
High
Total judgment Low/mixed High
30 The interconnection between regionalism and democracy was spec-
iﬁed in the very beginning of the studies on regionalism beyond Europe
by Ernst Haas and Philippe Schmitter (1964) and in very recent studies on
the topic (e.g., Schmitter, 2004).
31 An extensive literature of the reverse causation states that regional
integration increase democratization is based on the EU’s Enlargement
studies and international context of democratization in general. On this
topic, see, fro example, L. Whitehead (1996), J. Pridham (2005), Roberto
Di Quirico (2005), Anastassia Obydenkova (2007 and 2008).
32 For more details on the indicators, see Appendix 2. There indexes
were also summarized and analyzed by Gur Ofer and Pomfret (2004).
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of background conditions in intra-regional trade of the
members of EEC in the very beginning of European inte-
gration and Soviet republics by 1989, disintegration of the
USSR and beginning of numerous attempt at re-integration
and cooperation in the region. The so-called “process
conditions”, or condition in the time of economic union are
demonstrated by Table 6 by the changes in the share of the
export of PSSs to non-PSSs throughout nine years: 1991,
1993, 1995, 1997, and 1999, thus starting from the initial
stage of development of the CIS.
Table 6 presents quite interesting observation regarding
the radical change which took place in only nine years in
reorientation of export ﬂows of PSSs. Russia increasedmore
than twice its export to non-PSSs starting from 40.8% in
1991 and arriving at 85.3% of its total export. It is still the
leading country with the largest share of export to non-
PSSs countries. A set of countries increased it about 30
times more starting from 1.5% (Kirgizia and Georgia) and
increased export ﬂows up to 59.60% for Kirgizia and 50.0%
for Georgia in 1999.
4.3. Economic transition (economic disparities)
Another parameters of actual and potential member
states of regional integration which should be taken into
account in the case of post-Soviet Eurasia is regime tran-
sition which involved both political and economic
restructuring. The necessity of democratic government and
pluralism was speciﬁcally underlined by neofunctionalist.
However, the PSSs can not be expected to be democratic as
such, especially in the beginning of the establishment of
the CIS, the ﬁrst voluntary union of truly independent
states in Eurasia. The beginning of the CIS was also the
beginning of regime transition. Still certain homogeneity in
the process of transition would be expected. The following
table demonstrates different stages of development of PSSs
in terms of transition to market economy through
percentage of private sector in GDP (%), privatization (of
large and small enterprises), liberalization of prices, and
free competition (Table 7).
The country with the largest share of private sector in
GDP is Russia (70%), followed by Georgia, Armenia and
Kirgizia (all of them have 60% of private sector), Kazakhstan
and Ukraine (55% each), and the one with the lowest is
Belarus (only 20% of private sector). The index provide us
with very valuable information demonstrating the diver-
sity of economic transition in PSSs. In terms of economic
transition, Russia seems to be the most progressive asscored the highest among the PSSs: privatization of large
enterprises evaluated as “3þ”, privatization of small
enterprises – “4”, and freedom of market competition
evaluated as “2þ”.
As a result, there is incompatibility of economic models
of PSSs. In contrast, the experience of the EU demonstrates
that economic compatibility, independent and self-
sufﬁcient market economy of each actor-state is a prereq-
uisite of future success of regional integration. Thus, as
along as the divergence of economic models and economic
transition of the PSSs remains, there is little hope for
successful integration in the region.4.4. Political transition (regime disparities)
Apart from the disparities of the actual and potential
CIS-members across economic development, geography,
religions, there is also the signiﬁcant disparities among the
political regimes (ranging from democratic to authori-
tarian). The variable which seems to present as well the
crucial difference between Europe and post-Soviet Eurasia
is “pluralism”. While elite of Soviet states were all author-
itarian and, thus, “compatible”, the pluralism was absent.
The relationship between regionalism and democrati-
zation presents in this context the “chicken-and-the-egg”
dilemma. As a number of scholars underlined, the demo-
cratic regime and pluralism seem to be important, and
probably a crucial factor in the regional integration.30 On
the other hand, another set of scholars argue31 that
regionalism might also sustain democratic development.
That brings us to the problem of political transition (regime
transition or democratization) in the PSSs. The following
table gives some of the estimation on regime transition by
the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development
and World Bank.32
Themost advanced in the regime transitionCIS-members
reached level of “3” (with “4” being the highest). The scale
used in the last six columns ranges from 0 to 100. The index
Table 11
Process conditions and chances of automatic politicization.
Process Conditions CIS (2000) EEC / EU
1. Decision-making style Low Mixed
2. Rate of transaction Mixed/low High
3. Adaptability of
governments
None (diverging
of regimes)
High
Total judgment Low High
Chances of automatic
politicization
Low Good
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developed country.33 The table demonstrates very low level
of the democratic government on average. A relatively high
level of democratization was found in Armenia, Russia,
Georgia, Moldova, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.34 See also Egor Stroev, Leonid S. Bliakham, and Michail I. Krotov (1999)4.5. Comparative dimension: EU and CIS
Both neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism were
attempts to conceptualize European experience in inte-
gration and to apply theory to integration processes else-
where in the world. Indeed, the EU is the most signiﬁcant
among all attempts at regionalism. It provides some back-
ground for a comparative analysis with other unsuccessful
attempts at integration. The comparative aspect helps to
understand the impediments to regional integration and
conditions under which integration might succeed. Neo-
functionalism sets out the criteria for such a comparison.
Applying the criteria set out by neofunctionalism to
explain the Eurasian regionalism, I sum up the data pre-
sented above on the PSSs and divide it into three parts:
“background conditions”; “conditions at time of economic
union”; and “process condition”.
From the “total judgment” in each table, we can observe
the tendency of decreasing chances to integration: from
“high/mixed” chances (Tables 8 and 9) to “mixed/low”
(Table 8) and eventually to “low” (Table 10). The PSSs
started the attempts at regional cooperationwith relatively
very good background condition: high rate of transaction,
interdependent economies, infrastructure, not to mention
the standardized systems of education, common spoken
language, production, transportation and connection
between the most remote regions and sub-regions of Eur-
asia. We observe that the CIS-members have started the
process of integration as the most compatible along these
parameters following, however, the path of increasing
diversity. In conclusion, we’ll try to provide some under-
standing towards the phenomenon of post-Soviet region-
alism along with the theoretical framework of this study
(Table 11).
5. Conclusion
The theory of (neo)functionalism is built on the idea
that jurisdictional outcomes result from functional or
distributional pressures. Distributional pressures imply
delivery of goods and service – a “function”. It gave birth to33 Gur Ofer and Pomfret (2004: 22)the idea of spillover: once function works in one area, it
might well spell-over to another area, thus slowly initiated
the process of spillover. The case of disintegration of the
PSSs challenges this assumption.
Even compared to successful European integration, the
development of these networks of delivery services and
goods, creating a uniﬁed system of trains and roads is still
an undergoing process. Being formerly part of one country,
PSSs already possessed very well-developed system of
interactions: roads, railways, cross-national division of
labor. In addition, as it was demonstrated above, PSSs
possessed well-developed system of networks of delivary
goods, services, and even such vital resources as water and
energy. Cooperation on all levels – supranational; trans-
national; international, and ﬁnally, sub-national – was
very well-developed. However, despite the presence of
“functioning networks”, the system of networks was not
preserved and did not encourage the development of a new
union. Thus, the fundamental idea of a functionalism – the
importance of “function” proved to be totally wrong in the
case of post-Soviet regionalism.
Initially involuntary integration within the USSR made
PSSs unwilling to subordinate their powers to new supra-
national institutions, without which no regional integra-
tion is possible. “The shadow of the past” also explains the
desire of potential member states to manage their
economic policy entirely on their own, although preserving
state economy instead of market economy. There were no
attempts on the part of the ruling elite of the PSSs to
preserve those economic links and interconnections that
were developed during the Soviet period. Only in the
period 1991–1995 the total trade of the CIS-member states
fell from over 70% to 30%.34 By 1995 trade with the CIS
accounted for only 19.8 % of total Russian trade. This was
made mainly by transactions with only three countries,
Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan.
Contradicting to neofunctionalism and (liberal) inter-
governmentalism, this study has demonstrated that exis-
tence of functional and distributional pressures and related
to it functional networks is not sufﬁcient for successful
progress of integration. These theories were built on the
importance of a “function” – utility and delivery of goods
and services. While these networks of delivery addressed
functional and distributional pressures in and among post-
Soviet states, a number of important factors of integration
were still missing.
The ﬁrst factor is initial voluntary and peaceful uniﬁ-
cation with the presence of common identities or common
support of population of different candidate-states. The
second factor is the presence of democratic, or quasi-
democratic, regime and, preferably, market economy in
perspective member states.
Neofunctionalism provides an important set of criteria
of background conditions and conditions in the time
of the process of regional integration. While bothRussia and Eurasia at the Cossroads. Expirience and problems of Economic
Reforms in the Commonwealth of Independent States. Berlin: Springer;
Mark Webber (1997: 56–59), Obydenkova (2010a, 2010b).
36 A Study of Soviet Economy. Vol 1. Paris (1991), pp. 212, 213, 216;
Izvestia (15 March, 1996). Reprinted in Shishkov (2001: 405–406).
37 Hill (2004) and UNDP (2005:187).
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rather allow to analyze the “outcome” of the numerous
attempts at the integration in post-Soviet Eurasia: the role
of the “leader”, the nature of states as “rational actors”.
Intergovernmentalism provided explanations to such
phenomenon as super-presidentialism and bilateralism in
Eurasian regionalism.
Based on discussed above theories and empirical anal-
ysis of the CIS, some other important conclusions should be
outlined: the role of a “leader” and “asymmetry”, of
democracy and regime transition, autocracy, the role of
ethnicities and conﬂicts.
5.1. Asymmetries
The ﬁrst explanation is signiﬁcant geographical, socio-
economic, and political disparities across the PSSs. The
countries of former Soviet Union differ tremendously in
terms of geographic and demographic size, in the level of
economic development, natural resources endowments,
social, environmental and governance conditions. Given
the disparities of the actual and potential CIS-members
across such factors as economic development, social
infrastructures, political regimes (ranging from demo-
cratic to authoritarian), and coexistence of two religions,
it is only to be expected to ﬁnd also great degree of
diversity in various sectors of cooperation and various
involvement of countries in economic and political areas
of integration.
The role of disparities in Eurasian regionalism seems to
conﬁrm the assumptions of intergovernmentalism on
states’ motivation. It also conﬁrms the theory of neo-
functionalism regarding such “hidden” impediments to the
progress of the integration as the negative role of uneven
interest and beneﬁt of the states. Thus, smaller and poorer
countries tend to beneﬁt more from integration than
countries which are big in size and stronger economically.
This helps to explain why Central Asian countries are more
interested in such cooperation (among them particularly
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan), followed by Transcaucasian and
“European” countries. It seems that smaller and landlocked
countries tend to be more interested in regional coopera-
tion while the larger countries with access to the sea and
non-CIS countries tend to focus more on issues of national
and regional security. The discussion on disparities brings
about the problem of a “leader”.
5.2. Leader
The theories of regional integration approach differently
the role of a “leader”. A number of scholars underline the
importance of “the presence of an undisputed leader among
the group of countries seeking closer ties”.35 This is even
more important statement if the analysis focuses on the case
of post-Soviet republics where economic, geographical,
political, military predominance of Russia is apparent.
The role of a “leader” is ambiguous. On the one hand,
according to early neofunctionalism, it presents an35 Mattli (1999: 14).impediment to the progress of regional integration where
the actors are expected to be more or less homogenous.
Unlike in the EU, there is a strong dominant state in the
post-Soviet region, Russiawith 68 % of total GDP of all other
post-Soviet states, 91% of oil production, 72% of natural gas,
58% of steel production, and 70 % of former Soviet military
production.36 Whatever scheme of regional integration is
considered, Russia due to its largest population, size,
natural resources, and economic development, is involved
as a “leader”. The dominance of Russia encourages the
bilateral relationship of the PSSs with Russia, thus, dimin-
ishing multilateralism.
On the other hand, there is always an “attraction” of
a “leader” which offer beneﬁts from allaying with the most
powerful state. In the case of Eurasia, Russia was often
deﬁned as the “economic engine and economic pole of
attraction” for CIS-members.37 It is the region’s largest trade
partner, a supporter of the status quo for the current polit-
ical elite, and a source of technical and military assistance.
The Russian language is still largely used as the lingua franca
in the region. The role of the “leader” in the development of
regional integration will remain on the agenda of region-
alism in general in post-Soviet Eurasia in particular.
Potentially “leader” can indeed become an “engine of
integration”. However, the students still argue on positive
or negative role of such a state. This discussion is evenmore
complicated in the case of the CIS because of the presence
of the “shadow of the past” and the “shadow of the future”.
Attempts at regional cooperation, let alone integration,
initiated by Russia are often perceived as attempts at re-
establishing the Soviet Union, “shadow of the future”.
Thus, these attempts lack popularity and support of the
wider public. The “shadow of the past” is one of the serious
impediments in the process of regional integration as along
as it is initiated by Russia.5.3. Autocracies
As the analysis above demonstrated, another aspect of
the Soviet heritage is autocracy and well-entrenched
nepotism and system of clans. Strong presidencies
emerged from the institutions of the Communist Party’s
First Secretary.38 Presidential elections took place in all the
PSSs and they were not competitive. In all of these elec-
tions, the First Secretary of former Communist Party would
win. Subsequent political and economic “transition”,
institutional changes, establishing new bodies was all the
means to strengthen the chief in power. As the UNDP
expert states, “although the ideological belief in commu-
nism has all but disappeared, the belief in the need for state
directed and state-managed economic activity has per-
sisted”.39 An extensive system of patronage, that existed
during the Soviet period, remained and even intensiﬁed38 See for example, Tishkov 1997 (263–323), Mark Webber (1997).
39 UNDP (2005:171).
A. Obydenkova / Journal of Eurasian Studies 2 (2011) 87–102 99since. Government ofﬁcials created a network of loyalists.40
National governing elites do not want to subordinate
their powers to any kind of supranational institutions. They
gain a lot from building authoritarian kingdoms in the
geographic realm of “their own” states and are unwilling to
delegate even some of their powers to supranational
institutions. Both types of elites – Soviet nomenklatura
which remained in power and new elite emerged in the
period of transition – demonstrated the same patterns of
behavior and attitude towards any attempt at regional
integration. During the period of regime transition, legal
vacuum and corruption allows elite to develop great
powers. Integration as such limits the powers of clans and
their leaders by legal institutions and international laws.
Above all, autocracies tend to behave in international
relations the same way as they act in national politics:
looking for establishing personal contacts and bilateral
agreements rather than observing laws and delegating ofﬁ-
cially powers to supranational institutions. In other words,
the dominance of Russia also encourages the bilateral rela-
tionship of the PSSs with Moscow, thus, creating sort of
“inter-presidentialism” as a form of intergovernmentalism.
5.4. Ethnicities and conﬂicts
Another aspect of Soviet legacies is the inter-ethnic and
border tensions and conﬂict. The USSR stipulated the
concept of ethno-federalism with nominal rights to sover-
eignty of each CU. Many scholars of Soviet studies argue
that this system fostered to thewave of nationalism.41 After
the territorial disintegration of the USSR, a number of inter-
ethnic issues were left unresolved. The collapse provoked
and intensiﬁed wars and conﬂicts. Wars, civil wars, inter-
ethnic conﬂicts and tensions are all the obstacles for any
form of integration as well. These factors were also the
motives for national executives to build up the centralized
state systems within their realm and to assert their power
over the territory and to strengthen the borders. This
eventually led to the emergence of so-called “frozen”, still
unresolved, conﬂicts.
5.5. Regime transition: political and economic
The transition involves redistribution of assets, changes,
and uncertainty. All of the CIS-members have been
involved in the transition from centrally planned economy
to a market-based economy.
What is the most remarkable and peculiar about the
formation of the CIS is that the process of “integration”was
started at the same time as the process of the regime
transition of the PSSs. The regime transition was accom-
panied by disintegration, by attempts at nation-building
and later attempts at re-integration in the framework of
the CIS. These paralleled processes are distinctive features
of the integration within the CIS.
PSSs are not prepared economically to integration as
they do not have developed market economies. Neither40 See for example, Tishkov (1997).
41 Tishkov 1997, UNDP. (2005:166).they are prepared politically lacking pluralism and demo-
cratic institutions. The theoretical conclusion is that
regional integration seems to be impossible if its process is
paralleled by the process of regime transition and economic
development. In other words, the hypothesis forwarded by
Ph. Schmitter (1969,1996, 2000) on national democracyand
market economy as prerequisites for successful regional
integration is conﬁrmed by the unsuccessful experience of
PSSs in integration. The Eurasian regionalism proves that
the combination of certain degree of political decentral-
ization, democratization and non-state economy seems to
play an important role in regional integration.
To sum up, the attempts at the regional cooperation
in the post-Soviet space undertaken by former soviet
republics within the CIS were all unsuccessful due to
a number of important factors. The heterogeneity of the
prospective partners seem to be one of the crucial
obstacles to integration. In the case of both negative
(e.g., the removal of barriers to movement of capital,
labor, and services) and positive integration (e.g., the
coordination of economic policies and the harmoniza-
tion of political institutions), certain level in institutional
and economic homogeneity of member states plays an
important role. Institutional similarities and compati-
bility are indeed an important “background” condition of
the integration.
Due to the regime disparities, different paths of transi-
tion and strategies of regime development across PSSs, due
to striking differences in economic development, integra-
tion had little background for the successful development.
However, according to both liberal intergovernmentalism
and late neofunctionalism, the emergence of powerful
economic center, a “leader”, could play a positive role in
developing regional cooperation. To certain extent, it could
help to overcome disagreements and could become certain
engine of further closer cooperation.
Another prerequisite of regional integration which
proved to be important is democratic government and
market economy, or, in case of “transitional” countries,
relatively high level of democratization and economic
liberalization. Democratic governments are representative
and, therefore, more legitimate. They are more efﬁcient as
actors in the process of regional integration acting as
representatives of their peoples. Thus, certain level of
democratization is important feature of regional integra-
tion especially if it is to take place in between countries in
regime transition.
These obstacles – authoritarian regime, “supra-presi-
dentialism”, lack of market economy and economic liber-
alization – posed serious constraints to the development of
integration in the region. In addition, “shadow of the past”
and “shadow of the future”, seen as prospects of re-
integration of the former USSR within a new suprana-
tional organization (CIS), presented one of the main
obstacles to the development of regional cooperation. Thus,
prospects of re-integration became obstacle to the devel-
opment of regional cooperation.
However, a number of scholars pointed out that the
presence of high degree of social integration remained after
Soviet period can provide some support for future attempts
at cooperation in the region. Russian language as franca
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Soviet period, numerous academic and experts exchange
programmes and the existence of social networks could
also play an important role.42 The Eurasian regionalism is
indeed a peculiar case-study and can challenge a number of
theories of regional integration.
The major peculiarity is that in Eurasia the process of
“formal” integration was paralleled by the processes of
regime transition and of actual de-territorialization, frag-
mentation and disintegration. The experience of post-
Soviet Eurasia is indeed unique in this sense and should
be analyzed in further studies of regional integration.
Informal bilateral agreements dominated the formal
multilateral negotiations. These studies will not only proﬁt
from existing theories of regional integration but also
contribute to their future development.
Appendix 1. Institutional structure of the CIS
Council of the Heads of States This is a supreme body of
the CIS which discusses and solves any principle questions
of the Commonwealth connected with the common inter-
ests of the member states.
Council of the Heads of Governments This Council coor-
dinates cooperation of the executive authorities of the
states – participants in economic, social and other spheres
of their common interests. Decisions of the Council of the
Heads of States and the Council of the Heads of Govern-
ments are adopted by consensus. Any state may declare
about its lack of interest in one or another question, the fact
being not considered as an obstacle for adopting a decision.
Council of foreign ministers
The main executive body ensuring cooperation in the
ﬁeld of foreign policy activities of the states – participants
of the CIS on the matters of mutual interest, adopting
decisions during the period between the meetings of the
Council of the Heads of States, the Council of the Heads of
Governments and by their orders.
Council of Defence Ministers This is a body of the Council
of the Heads of States responsible for military policy of the
states – participants of the CIS. Its working ofﬁce is a Staff
which coordinates military cooperation of the CIS member
states, prepares and holds meetings of the Council of
Defence Ministers, organizes the activities of groups of
military observers and collective forces for peace keeping
in the CIS. It is also responsible for guarding outer frontiers
of the states – participants and securing stable situation
there. Its working ofﬁce is a Coordinating Service of the
Council which organizes preparation and holding of the
meetings of this Council, implementation of the decisions
adopted by it
Inter-parliamentary assembly (IPA)
IPA was established in March 1992 as a consultative
institution. The ﬁrst participants were Armenia, Belarus,42 Fidrmuk, 2001, Libman (2006), Obydenkova (2010b).Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia.
Between 1993 and 1996, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova
also joined. Ukraine joined in 1999. IPA sessions are held
twice a year in Saint Petersburg, and are composed of
parliamentary delegations of the member states. The IPA
has nine permanent commissions: on legal issues; on
economy and ﬁnance; on social policy and human rights;
on ecology and natural resources; on defense and security
issues; on culture, science, education and information
issues; on foreign policy affairs; on state-building and local
government; on control budget. The Inter-parliamentary
Assembly of Member Nations of the Commonwealth of
Independent States (IPA CIS) was established on 27 March
1992 under the Alma-Ata Agreement signed by Heads of
Parliaments of the Republic of Armenia, Republic of
Belarus, Republic of Kazakhstan, Kyrghyz Republic, Russian
Federation, Republic of Tajikistan, and Republic of Uzbeki-
stan, to act as an advisory body in preparing draft legisla-
tive documents of mutual interest. Between 1993 and 1996
the Inter-parliamentary Assembly was joined by the
parliaments of the Azerbaijan Republic, Georgia, and
Republic of Moldova. Ukraine became party to the Alma-
Ata Agreement in 1999. On 26 May 1995 the Convention
on the Inter-parliamentary Assembly of Member Nations of
the Commonwealth of Independent States was signed by
Heads of the CIS States, taking effect from 16 January 1996.
The Convention deﬁnes the Inter-parliamentary Assembly
as an interstate body and a key agency of the Common-
wealth of Independent States. On 28 August 1997 the
Agreement between the Inter-parliamentary Assembly of
Member Nations of the Commonwealth of Independent
States and the Government of the Russian Federation on
Terms of Residence of the Inter-parliamentary Assembly on
the Territory of the Russian Federation was signed and
ratiﬁed on 26 November 1998 by the Federal Law signed by
the President of the Russian Federation.
Economic Court Economic Court functions with the aim
of ensuring the meeting of economic commitments in the
framework of the CIS. Its terms of reference include
settlement of interstate economic controversy arising in
meeting economic commitments envisaged by Agreements
and decisions of the Council of the Heads of States and the
Council of the Heads of Governments of the CIS. The
Economic Court operates for the purposes of fulﬁlling
economic obligations under the framework of the CIS. The
mandate of the Economic Court includes the resolution of
disputes arising during the implementation of economic
obligations. The Court may also resolve other disputes
classiﬁed as within its mandate by agreements of member
states. The Economic Court has the right to interpret
provisions of agreements and other acts of the Common-
wealth for economic issues. The Economic Court carries out
its activity in accordance with an Agreement on the Status
of the Economic Court and a Statute thereon, approved by
the Council of Heads of States.
Economic Council The main executive body which
ensures implementation of the decisions of the Council of
the Heads of States and the Council of the Heads of
Governments of the Commonwealth of Independent States
on realization of the Agreement for creation of free trade
zone, Protocol to it, as well as for other matters of socio-
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the matters related to its competence and by the orders of
the Council of the Heads of States and the Council of the
Heads of Governments of the CIS. Economic Council
consists of the Deputy Heads of Governments of states-
participants of the CIS.
Executive committee (legal successor of the executive
secretariat)
It is the permanently functioning executive, administra-
tive and coordinating body of the CIS, which organizes the
activities of the Council of the Heads of States, Council of the
HeadsofGovernments, Council of ForeignMinisters of states
– participants of the CIS, Economic Council and other bodies
of the Commonwealth, prepares proposals on extending
economic cooperation in the framework of the CIS, creating
and functioning free trade zone, ensuring favorable condi-
tions for transition to higher stage of economic cooperation,
developing common economic space in future, jointly with
the states – participants and the bodies of the Common-
wealth develops proposals and draft documents aimed at
the development of states – participants of the CIS in polit-
ical, economic, social and other spheres.43
Interstate Bank The most important function of the
Interstate Bank is organization and implementation of
multilateral interstate settlements between central
(national) banks in relation to trade and other transactions,
as well as coordination of monetary policy of the states –
participants.
Another important institutions are Council of Border
Troops Commanders, Council of Collective Security, Inter-
state Statistical Committee.
Appendix 2. Six components of democratic
governance: estimation for 2000/2001
The index measuring democratic government is based
on the work of Kaufmann (2001, 2002), World Bank Insti-
tute database and reproduced in Gir Ofer and Pomfret
(2004:21).
1) Voice and accountability: quality of the democratic
political process and civil and private liberties;
2) Political instability and violencemeasures the threat and
realization of destabilizing the government of regime by
any form of unlawful means;
3) Government effectiveness measures the quality of
inputs, mostly of the bureaucracy, and of the processes
by which policy is being formed and independence of
political interference;
4) Regulatory burden focuses on the quality of the policies
and degree to which they interfere negatively with the
operation of market economy;43 More information and data on these institutions and structure can be
found online: http://www.cis.minsk.by.5) The rule of law measures respect for the law and the
quality of the judiciary and enforcement arms;
6) Control of corruption estimates the inclination of people
and ofﬁcials to offer and accept bribes and the various
forms of grand corruption.
(Kaufmann et al., 2002, pp. 4–6 and Appendix and
referred and outlined in Gir Ofer & Pomfret, 2004: 22).
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